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GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE OR
NATIONAL TAX DISCRIMINATION:
THE CASE OF THE EU VS. APPLE
by
John Paul

I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 30, 2016, the European Commission (EC)
concluded that Ireland and Apple Inc. (Apple) had violated the
European Union (EU) state aid rules when Ireland granted tax
advantages to Apple; therefore, the EC ordered Ireland to collect
up to €13 billion euros ($15.3 billion U.S. dollars) in tax
underpayments from Apple for the 2003 to 2014 period.1 The
amount at issue makes this case one of the largest tax
controversies in history and has generated a lot of press as a
result.2
While the amount in the EC vs. Apple case is
unprecedented, it is only one of several EC Decisions dealing
with the taxation of multinational transfer pricing activities
issued recently, possibly in response to both a United States
(U.S.) Senate investigation into U.S. multinational tax practices
and the “Luxembourg Leaks” documents released by the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.3 Arguing
that each multinational firm received illegal state aid, the EC has
Assistant Professor of Accounting, Law & Taxation, Koppelman School
of Business, Brooklyn College/City University of New York
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recently initiated or finalized decisions adverse to Google4,
Starbucks,5 Apple6 and Amazon7 based on the specific transfer
pricing methodologies each used with the endorsement of tax
authorities in several EU member states.8
Each of the EC’s Decisions finds that a EU Member
State granted state aid in violation of the Treaty on the Function
of the European Union (TFEU), Article: 107(1).9 The EC found
that each of the rulings at issue provided an advantage to a
specific taxpayer or class taxpayers.10 While it is clear that the
EC can examine EU Member State tax ruling practices for the
type of “selectivity” or discrimination that would constitute
illegal state aid in contravention of the TFEU,11 the recent EC
decisions exceeded the scope of the EC’s authority by
questioning the general relevant principles and provisions of
Member State law without showing that the challenged practices
were selective.
The EC’s Decisions have been harshly criticized by
multinational firms and regulators but appear to reflect prior
criticism that some experts have levied against multinational
companies and low-tax jurisdictions.12 It is probable that the
EC’s power to review Member State tax laws and tax ruling
practices under state aid principles will be decided by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the next decade.
The issue is whether the EC has the right to override state
sovereignty in order to enforce a global tax governance structure
based on the EC’s tax sovereignty principles. Under ECJ case
law, a finding of state aid requires a finding of selectivity and a
finding of advantage.13 In the rulings at issue, however, the EC
has conflated the selectivity and advantage criterion into a single
concept of selective advantage, thereby minimizing the
selectivity requirement despite the fact that selectivity is an
important part of state aid jurisprudence.14 Basically, the EC is
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violating state sovereignty by creating its own interpretation of
tax sovereignty in order to enforce its own brand of global tax
governance.
This article theorizes that the EC’s enforcement initiative
could harm the global economy through the erosion of tax
certainty and that the EC’s retroactive application of the EC’s
interpretive tax sovereignty principle is not supported by ECJ
law. The EC’s version of tax sovereignty will likely exacerbate
the very harms that the state aid rules were implemented to
prevent. Instead of creating a structure of global tax governance,
the EC appears to be creating a global chaos of tax uncertainty
by overriding state sovereignty.

II.

EVALUATING GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE

The international economy raises important questions
about the structure of global tax governance systems intended to
protect markets where globalization implies the erosion of
national boundaries.15 In this respect, it can be argued that the
power to implement national regulations within those
boundaries declines because people can easily leave their
jurisdictions and because the flows of capital are too large and
sudden for any one regulator to control.16
In contrast, the liberal globalist response to the concern
about the erosion of state regulatory power is to build a larger
global apparatus, such as the United Nations or EC systems
constituted by a legally binding treaty, with expanding
governance powers.17 With the globalization of tax transactions
and increasing interdependence among nation-states, there is a
growing conflict between the conventional notion of state
sovereignty and the flow of tax activity, which disrupts
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coherence of the state. In the meantime, the various agencies and
institutions within the state, such as independent central banks,
develop a high degree of independence reflecting the
fragmentation or desegregation of the nation-state.18
When it came to tax issues, Westphalian sovereignty at
one time was largely respected. The basic rule of Westphalian
sovereignty is non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
states, guaranteeing the autonomy of the national political
authorities over a nation-state’s territory.19 Non-intervention is
closely linked to the idea of self-determination, which many felt
was necessary to the growth and development of a nation-state.20
In recent decades, Westphalian sovereignty has been
undermined due to the increasing mobility of the tax base,
especially capital. Regulatory changes such as the
discontinuation of capital controls in one nation-state can affect
not only the economies of the surrounding nation-states but even
the nation-states in other parts of the world. Economic agents
can now move their various forms of capital between nations and
shop for the lowest tax burden and this led to calls for more
global tax governance.21
Global governance establishes rules dealing with issues
that each nation already regulates within its territorial
boundaries such as crime, pollution, securities fraud and tax
evasion. In contrast, traditional international law requires
nation-states to implement the international obligations they
incur through their own domestic law22. Transgovernmentalism
supporters claim that the enforcement of domestic law has been
made more difficult due to globalization propelled by the
information revolution.23 The transgovernmentalist view
stresses that regulators potentially reap the benefits from
coordinating their enforcement efforts with those of their foreign
peers and from ensuring that other nation-states adopt similar
approaches.24
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Transgovernmentalists likewise argue that the domestic
order fragmentation of the nation-state is essential to the
development of the global regulatory governance system. They
claim that the global governance of the economy requires the
globalization of state agencies as long as these agencies maintain
a high degree of autonomy and independence. To
transgovernmentalists, the transformation of state sovereignty
represents the regulatory harmonization through “the
nationalization of international law.”25 Transgovernmentalists
highlight that each nation-state will be better able to enforce its
domestic law by implementing the agreement if foreign peers do
likewise in accordance with regulatory agreements that are
pledges of self-enforcing good faith.26
In 2009, a U.S. federal court in Florida ruled that the
Swiss bank UBS had to provide client information for up to
52,000 U.S. citizens to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Before this case was finally settled, a Swiss government official
stated that “the court would be substituting its own authority for
that of the competent Swiss authorities, and therefore would
violate Swiss sovereignty and international law.”27 It seems that
nations are now expected to shift fiscal competencies up the
ladder of governance and is incompatible with the notion of state
sovereignty. Shifting fiscal competencies in such a way endows
supra-national institutions, such as the EC, with the power to
govern nations based on their own principles, which may run
counter to the principles of the sovereign nations.28

III.

IRELAND AND THE EU

With regard to the EC vs. Apple and Ireland case, the
argument can be made that Ireland decided to enter into an
agreement with Apple based on Irish values and needs. To the
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Irish, employment opportunities may be more important than
massive taxes. If the Irish feel that the only way to lure a large,
global company such as Apple to its borders is by reducing the
tax burden the global company has to pay, why does the EC have
the ethical duty to override the Irish belief regarding taxes? Does
the EC provide job opportunities to the local Irish citizens? If the
answer is no, then who is the EC to decide what Irish agreements
should be upheld and what Irish agreements should be
overruled?
In the U.S., there is a Federal tax code that is applicable
to all U.S. citizens and residents regardless of where they
reside.29 The IRS is responsible for enforcing and collecting
Federal taxes.30 Each state in the U.S. has its own tax code in
addition to the Federal tax code. State taxes are only applicable
to the residents of that particular state and there is no uniformed
collection agency for state taxes.31 When there is a conflict
between Federal tax and State tax, the Federal tax code prevails
under the supremacy clause of the US Constitution.32
While the U.S. operates under federalism, the EU does
not. Although the EU founders wanted federalism, years of
negotiations ultimately resulted in the rejection of such a
system.33 As a result, the EU does not impose a tax on EU
citizens and each EU citizen is taxed in her/his respective
member state.34
After a failed attempt to establish an EU Constitution,35
the Treaty of Lisbon was pushed forward to incorporate many of
the EU Constitutional principles.36 All of the EU member states
agreed to ratify the treaty through their respective legislatures,
except for Ireland. Due to concerns over the loss of Irish
sovereignty, two-thirds of the Irish public voted against the
Treaty of Lisbon.37 Since the incorporation of a treaty into EU
law requires the unanimous agreement of all the member states,
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the Treaty of Lisbon was not ratified and failed to become part
of EU law; therefore, the EU was forced to make specific
concessions to Ireland to encourage a “yes” vote in a second
referendum.38
The major concession made to Ireland was regarding its
tax law. In exchange for a “yes” vote, Ireland and the other
European leaders agreed to a special protocol,39 specific only to
Ireland and having no effect on the other EU member states.40
Ireland was provided several guarantees including competence
over its own tax laws. After receiving this protocol from the EU,
the Irish public voted two-thirds in favor to ratify the Treaty of
Lisbon.41 While the EU still lacks competence over the tax codes
of the member states, it participates in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).42

IV.

THE OECD

The OECD provides tax policies and guidelines that have
facilitated the elimination of harmful tax laws.43 Over thirty
nations, including several EU members, participate in the OECD
and contribute to the development of policies and practices for
greater economic cooperation. The release of the OECD’s
Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital (OECD Model) facilitated the growth of bilateral tax
agreements – from less than one-hundred prior to its release, to
over 3,000 and many nations rely on it for treaty text.44
One of the OECD’s most astute contributions to global
tax has been its transfer pricing guidelines. Transfer pricing is
the process multinational corporations use to assign values to
goods and services that involve global transactions between
related corporations. The OECD’s 1979 Transfer Pricing and
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Multinational Enterprises Report (OECD Report) created the
arm’s length principle, which provides that transactions between
related corporations “should not be treated differently for tax
purposes from similar transactions between independent parties
solely by virtue of the fact that the enterprises are associated.”45
Although the OECD Report was officially repealed in 1995, the
arm’s length principle remained the standard in evaluating
transfer pricing agreements.
Following the 2008 global crisis, the OECD issued the
2010 Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
and Tax Administrations (OECD Guidelines). The OECD
Guidelines reaffirmed the arm’s length principle as the
appropriate standard for evaluating transfer pricing.46 Many
OECD member nations formally adopted the OECD Guidelines
into their national laws even though the were not required to do
so.47
As many nations continued to face fiscal crises after
2008, the OECD identified Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) as a problem and created the BEPS Project to address
the mismatches in tax rules that allow a corporation to pay low
tax or no tax on its profits. The BEPS Project held its first
meeting in 2016 and more than eighty nations participated
including Ireland and the US. While the BEPS Project strives to
reduce global tax avoidance, many multinational corporations
take advantage of the differences between nations’ tax systems,
including Apple, which utilized the difference between the US
and Irish tax systems.48
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V.

U.S. VS. IRELAND TAX LAW

The difference between U.S. corporate tax law and Irish
corporate tax law creates a tax haven for multinational
corporations. Under the U.S. incorporation system, a
corporation is subject to U.S. tax only when it is incorporated in
the U.S. Under the Irish incorporation system, a corporation is
subject to Irish tax only when it resides in Ireland.49 As an
example, suppose DEF Corp. is incorporated in New York,
which subjects it to the U.S. corporate tax rate of 35 percent.
Now suppose DEF Corp. is also incorporated in Ireland. The fact
that DEF Corp. is incorporated in Ireland does not automatically
subject it to the Irish corporate tax of 12.5%; in order for DEF
Corp. to be subjected to the Irish tax, it would need to meet the
Irish residency requirements.
The Irish tax residence definition differs from the global
tax residence definition. Under the global tax law, residence is
decided by the taxpayer’s physical and economic state
presence.50 Ireland does not define tax residence in its tax code
and instead adopted the United Kingdom’s judicially-created
residency test.51 In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. Vs Howe,
De Beers was incorporated in South Africa where it operated
diamond mines but maintained an office in the United Kingdom
where nine of De Beers’ sixteen board members were located.
The court found that a corporation is a resident where its central
management and control were located and concluded that De
Beers was a resident of the United Kingdom.52
Now suppose DEF Corp. is incorporated in Ireland with
its central management and control is based in its New York
office. Under Irish tax law, the fact that DEF Corp.’s central
management and control is in New York means that DEF Corp.
could avoid paying the Irish corporate tax of 12.5 percent. The
difference between the Irish and global tax systems helped
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Ireland attract some of the largest multinational corporations in
the world, including Apple.
Apple’s tax loophole in Ireland was codified by applying
the OECD Model as well as the 1997 US Tax Convention with
Ireland. Since Apple’s subsidiaries were incorporated in Ireland,
none of them were subject to U.S. corporate tax. Furthermore,
since the central management and control of Apple’s
subsidiaries were located in Apple’s headquarters in the US, the
subsidiaries were not subject to Irish corporate tax.53 Basically,
Apple legitimized its tax-free structure through the OECD
Model and a bilateral tax treaty between the US and Ireland.
Another tax arrangement between Apple and Ireland
involved one of Apple’s subsidiaries, Apple Sales International
(ASI). In 1991, Apple created the Irish subsidiary of ASI, which
recorded all of Apple’s profits in Europe, Africa, the Middle
East and India. If someone bought a phone in Spain for example,
the sale would be recorded by ASI in Ireland, not in Spain. ASI
then paid the annual Irish tax rates that were in the range of .005
percent and 1 percent until 2014, according to the profit-sharing
agreement between Ireland and Apple. Ireland had one of the
lowest corporate tax rates in the EU – 12.5 percent – while most
of the other EU member states had corporate tax rates of over 16
percent with the Belgium tax rate rising as high as 33.9 percent.54
Although Apple was one of the top technology
companies during the 1980s, the stiff competition from
Microsoft and Windows during the 1990s caused Apple to
restructure pricing allocation among its Irish subsidiaries.55 In
1991, Apple received a ruling from the Irish government which
allowed Apple to allocate 65% of its operating expenses to its
subsidiary, Apple Operations Europe (AOE), for revenue up to
$60 - $70 million and 20% of operating expenses for any excess
revenue. In 2007, Apple received another ruling that approved
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Apple’s reduced operating expenses allocation of 10-20% and it
inclusion of a 1% to 9% Intellectual Property return to its AOE
subsidiary. The 1991 Irish government ruling stated that all
revenue attributed to ASI would be taxed at 12.5% and the 2007
Irish government ruling allocated 8% to 18% of operating costs
to ASI. These rulings caught the attention of the US
government.56
In 2013, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs (Subcommittee) started to investigate
Apple’s off-shore profit sharing arrangements. Apple denied the
use of illegal tax schemes and suggested that US corporate tax
law be updated in light of the new digital age. While the
Subcommittee eventually found that current US laws did not
prohibit Apple’s tax structure in Ireland, the investigation caught
the attention of the EC.57

VI.

THE EC VS. APPLE

In 2014, the EC opened an investigation to determine if
the 1991 and 1997 Irish tax rulings granted to Apple constituted
state aid in violation of the TFEU.58 According to the EU, state
aid is illegal when a Member State provides a company a
selective advantage that distorts or attempts to distort
competition. All EU member states are required to receive EC
approval prior to granting state aid. If an EU member state grants
state aid that violates the TFEU, then the EC must recover the
illegal state aid from the recipient.59
In the U.S., there is no equivalent for EU state aid; in
fact, the U.S. has a different policy regarding corporate
subsidies. US corporations enjoy subsidies in the form of grants,
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loans and/or tax breaks from both the federal and state
governments.60 Federal government grants and tax credits often
total billions of dollars, while federal loans and bailouts exceed
trillions. Unlike the EU, the U.S. had not adopted strict
guidelines on the use of government subsidies to corporations.61
The EU scrutinizes corporate subsidies that the US
commonly provides, such as agriculture, energy and
transportation.62 State aid rules are difficult for U.S.
multinationals to navigate, especially since they come from a
nation that provides corporations generous tax credits.63 This
may explain why the EC’s decision was unchartered territory for
Apple.
In reviewing the Irish tax rulings, the EC found that
Apple received illegal state aid in violation of the TFEU.
According to the EC, the tax rulings allowed Apple to engage in
transfer pricing that did not reflect the economic realities of the
transactions. This allowed Apple to allocate millions in profits
to specific Apple subsidiaries in Ireland that were not subject to
taxes in any nation.
In deciding that Apple’s transfer pricing was not proper,
the EC relied on the 2010 OECD Report Guidelines. The EC
found that Apple did not provide the proper documentation
supporting its transfer pricing tax proposal to the Office of the
Revenue Commissioners as required by Section V of the OECD
Report Guidelines. Furthermore, the EC found that one of
Apple’s subsidiaries in Ireland had no real activities
demonstrating the lack of economic justification for the transfer
pricing allocation.
It was apparent to the EC that Apple received state aid
from Ireland. The Irish tax rulings were selective because they
were directed solely towards Apple. These rulings also provided
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Apple with an advantage in the EU since it paid significantly
lower taxes, allowing it to allocate more money to advancing its
global operations. This tax avoidance allowed Apple to receive
a substantial benefit compared to other businesses, which
distorted competition in the internal market.

VII.

THE VIOLATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AND DISCRIMINATION

As stated earlier, the EU granted concessions to Ireland
in exchange for Ireland voting “yes” to accepting the Treaty of
Lisbon. One of these concessions was allowing Ireland to retain
competence over its own tax laws.64 This means that Ireland
shouldn’t need to obtain approval from the EC in order to grant
state aid to Apple or any other company. It seems that the EU is
ignoring the protocol it granted to Ireland in exchange for its
vote. If the EU can ignore the agreements it creates with member
nations, it means that the EU can violate the sovereignty of those
nations.
Again, the EU does not practice federalism as the US
does. Federalism was attempted by the EU but rejected by the
member states. The EU does not impose taxes EU citizens and
each EU citizen is taxed in her/his own member state.65 So, since
the EU does not have the power to tax EU citizens, the EU
shouldn’t be imposing a retrospective tax on Apple for doing
business in Ireland.
Apple’s tax arrangement in Ireland did not constitute
state aid within the meaning of the TFEU since it failed to meet
the “selective advantage” requirement.66 Just as Apple did, Irish
corporations could have avoided paying the Irish corporate tax
by incorporating in Ireland and establishing management and
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control in another country; this arrangement was not limited to
Apple. Furthermore, even if the Irish tax rulings did meet the
“selective advantage” requirement, they can’t be deemed to
distort or attempt to distort competition since there is no unified
EU tax system. Since there is no unified EU tax sovereignty, the
EU is once again violating the state sovereignty of Ireland.
Many US government officials have condemned the
EC’s decision against Apple. The US Treasury Department
announced that it believed the EU was reaching into US
corporations in order to take US tax revenue.67 Other sources
have examined the EC’s investigations into US corporation tax
structures in EU member nations as discriminatory litigation.
While many recognize the longstanding concept of state aid,
they find that pursuing civil investigations primarily against US
companies under a new interpretation of state aid creates
disturbing global tax policy precedents.68 Many also feel that
imposing a giant tax bill on company years after the fact sends
the wrong message to global job creators.69
Indicative of the EC’s discriminatory practices against
US firms are the recent investigations into Google and
Amazon.70 Google was investigated by the EC for alleged
antitrust and data privacy violations and is now being
investigated for violating the tax policies of France, Spain and
the United Kingdom. In 2016, Google’s offices in France and
Spain were raided by the EC as part of the investigation.
Amazon is being investigated for the alleged violation of state
aid in Luxembourg.71
The EC’s investigations into US corporations has
prompted US retaliation against the EU. The US Treasury and
the IRS issued Notice 2016-52 addressing proposed regulations
for foreign tax credits used to offset US tax obligations. The US
is concerned that US corporations will now be able to offset
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current US tax obligations to a greater extent since the EC is
assessing tax years that are more than two years prior to the
current tax year. If the EC continues to target US corporations
and assess back taxes on the basis of illegal state aid, the US will
have major tax revenue losses stemming from foreign tax
credits.72
To avoid the major foreign tax credit loss, the US
Treasury and the IRS are reducing foreign tax credits. The
reduction of foreign tax credits could in turn reduce foreign
investment since US corporations may be faced with the
possibility of paying double taxation on certain foreign earnings.
Since both the EU and the US can’t really afford reductions in
their respective economies, the ECJ should reject the EC’s
decision against Apple in order to discourage the EC’s
discriminatory practice against US corporations.

VIII. CONCLUSION
The EC’s recent actions regarding US multinational
corporations raises important questions about the structure of
global tax governance systems intended to protect markets
where globalization implies the erosion of national boundaries.
With the globalization of tax transactions and increasing
interdependence among nations, there is a growing conflict
between the traditional notion of state sovereignty and tax
sovereignty, which disrupts coherence of the state.
The EU member-states rejected the notion of the EU
serving in a federal capacity; therefore, the EU does not impose
a tax on EU citizens and each EU citizen is taxed in his or her
respective member state. Furthermore, the EU does not negotiate
member state tax treaties or implement member state tax policies
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for each member state -- that is left to each of the member states
to decide as sovereign nations. Yet, the EC is now imposing
retrospective taxes on US multinational companies as if the EC
is a federal EU tax sovereignty. Since the EU does not have the
right to override state sovereignty and impose its own
discriminatory judgments against multinational companies, the
Member States should challenge the authority of the EU.
It seems as if sovereign nations must now shift their
fiscal competencies up the ladder of governance and this is a
violation of state sovereignty. But if the EC can override a
sovereign nation’s tax policy, then it will cause confusion among
corporations as to what tax law should be followed. Apple can
enter into a tax agreement with the Irish government but not with
the EC so the EC should not be allowed to erode the integrity of
the Irish government.
The EC’s example of retrospective taxation sends a
wrong signal to the global business community since any tax
breaks awarded by a sovereign member nation could be reversed
by the EC. The entire investment made by a company could be
forfeited just because the EC deems a tax arrangement to be
unfair. These cases do not set a good precedent and may
discourage companies from investing in EU nations if there are
better alternatives in other parts of the world. Accordingly, the
ECJ should respect state sovereignty and reject discriminatory
practices; therefore, the ECJ should reject the EC’s case against
Apple.
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